Equilibrium points in n-person games john nash

This Book has been Viewed Time s. Contact me by fax. For some items, we can also email digital photographs. All of our items are guaranteed as described and are shipped on approval.

For first-time buyers, we prefer a credit card and we will only ship to the billing address on the card. Share This Paper. Background Citations. Methods Citations. Results Citations. Citation Type. Has PDF. Publication Type. More Filters. A continuous time non-cooperative n-person Markov game with a stopped set is studied in this paper.

We prove that, in the game process with or without discount factor, there exists an optimal … Expand. Existence of Nash equilibrium for chance-constrained games. Mathematics, Computer Science. Highly Influenced. View 4 excerpts, cites background. We show that there exists an e-equilibrium point in the n-person game if and … Expand. Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players. In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite.

A short summary of this paper. Equilibrium Points in n-person Games. This follows from the arguments used in a forthcoming paper.

We do not restrict ourselres to finite complexes. CT III uses in place of. I Eilenberg, S. Note that K exists and is a CW complex by N of p. However this proof cannot be generalized to the case W 1. Lefschetz, November 16, One may define a concept of an n-person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n-tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player. POL YA 49 distributions over the pure strategies, the pay-off functions are the expecta- tions of the players, thus becoming polylinear forms in the probabilities with which the various players play their various pure strategies.

Any n-tuple of strategies, one for each player, may be regarded as a point in the product space obtained by multiplying the- n strategy spaces of the players.