Baltic games poland 2014

It considers these minorities as an important political means of exerting influence. Current deployments include its continuing aggressive action against Ukraine, its positions in Moldova and in the north Caucasus, including the occupation of some Georgian territory, as well as its involvement in Syria.

In case of military conflict, this district would be responsible for confronting NATO, and thus is traditionally one of the strongest.

In , Russia continued to strengthen its forces in the WMD, directed against NATO and Europe: the district now includes three army commands, five new division headquarters, and 15 new mechanized regiments. Although some units are currently deployed close to Eastern Ukraine, due to the ongoing conflict there, the Russian armed forces has the following units located near the Baltic states: one guards air assault division, the first of Russian airborne unit to include a third manned air assault regiment, and one Spetsnaz brigade, both stationed in Pskov about 32 km from Estonia ; two motorized rifle brigades; one artillery brigade and one missile brigade, equipped with 12 dual-use Iskander missiles; one army aviation brigade and one air defense regiment, equipped with S missiles.

Even discounting Russian forces in Kaliningrad, Russia is thought to have absolute military supremacy in peacetime, in terms of tanks, fighter aircraft, rocket artillery and short-range ballistic missiles Iskander. These allow Russia to threaten the Baltic states from two directions and could delay or even impede rapid NATO reinforcement of the Baltic states in a conflict see chapters 2. The emphasis is on rapid mobilization, superb mobility, including across military districts, and high firepower.

If a crisis or conflict with NATO were to arise in the Baltic region, Russia would depend on its ability to swiftly mobilize, move, and concentrate forces. It would aim to take decisive action well before NATO could effectively respond militarily and launch high-intensity defensive operations. The exclave of Kaliningrad constitutes a crucial, highly unusual asset for Russia in the Baltic region. Since , the Kaliningrad region has enjoyed the status of a Special Economic Zone within the Russian Federation, resulting in steady economic growth.

As of Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad included a motorized rifle brigade, a motorized rifle regiment, a tank regiment, a naval infantry brigade as well as strong artillery, air and missile defense and aviation forces. The majority of Baltic Fleet vessels are located at Baltiysk, with the remainder of the fleet located close to St.

If Russia seized and closed the corridor, it would cut land connections between the Baltic States and other NATO allies, significantly complicating reinforcement. Moreover, the Baltic states are willing and prepared to defend their countries, and very much prepared to immediately counter hostile Russian hybrid tactics, in particular possible mobilizations of Russian minorities.

In case of a confrontation, Russia is likely not to repeat the Ukraine scenario, but instead turn to a swift, decisive conventional attack supported by hybrid means for example, with disinformation or cyber-attacks. Russia also gained combat experience both in Ukraine and in Syria.

Moscow used air defense weapons both in the occupied territories of Eastern Ukraine and within Russia. Another way of describing the system of systems is as a set of multiple, mutually reinforcing military means. These include overlapping air defense systems, long-range artillery, high-precision strike capabilities short- and medium-range conventional or nuclear ballistic missiles and cruise missiles , anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons, and electronic warfare systems.

Together these capabilities create a multi-layered, comprehensive defense of key regions. For example, during the Soviet era, Kaliningrad was surrounded by allies and Russia controlled over half the Baltic coastline, but today Moscow sees the region as encircled by NATO, and thus a vulnerability. Petersburg regions. This also applies to A2AD assets. Russian understandings of modern war and modern victory are reflected in its military doctrine and literature, but also in the design and scenarios used in military exercises.

The overall aim is to present NATO with a fait accompli before it can effectively respond. Being prepared to use nuclear weapons to persuade NATO to stand down is an integral and important part of this approach. Over time, these exercises have become increasingly detailed and complex. The fact that these exercises are often in violation of conventional arms control agreements is not the key point. Also, in keeping with traditional, capability-focused logic, the Russian military has also been regularly training and exercising for large-scale, high-intensity scenarios.

In addition, readiness checks for wartime conditions also take place in civilian agencies, including the ministries of health, agriculture, industry and commerce, and federal agencies for medical-biological issues, state reserves, and regional administrations. Besides, the scale of exercises indicates that, while in the mids Russia was preparing for small-scale local wars, in the s it has also been training for large-scale conflicts, including against NATO countries.

Another important study has pointed out how Russia actually imagined large-scale war against NATO in the Baltic region, using the Zapad exercise as an indicator.

After compiling and comparing several Russian military exercises in , Daivis Petraitis argued that combining the exercises reveals a strategy of a three-stage major conflict against NATO in the Baltic region, as imagined by Russian military planners. Moreover, besides fighting a partially covert, but conventional war in Ukraine, and maintaining political and military influence in Georgia and Moldova, in particular by protracting conflicts, Russia has continuously strengthened its positions in Syria and the broader Mediterranean region.

In , Moscow obtained a concession to use both Tartus seaport and Kheimim airbase for 49 years. Russian military presence in the Middle East is now becoming a permanent factor. In addition, Russia is increasingly involved in the war in Libya, providing paramilitary forces and delivering heavy equipment to the warlord Khalifa Haftar. Russia is also increasing its military presence and activities in the Arctic region.

This involvement includes concrete military affairs, and also shipping, energy security, and environmental issues.

As already outlined, sizeable Russian-speaking minorities already live in the Baltic States, particularly in Estonia and Latvia. Not all are ethnic Russians, the numbers include some Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars and others. However, from the perspective of this study, it is the number of Russians that matters most. According to the latest national censuses, the following totals of Russians live in the three Baltic States, as compiled by Liliya Karachurina in Compared to the last Soviet census held in , there was a considerable decrease in ethnic Russians in all three countries, particularly Estonia and Latvia.

Nevertheless, as outlined above chapter 2. Moscow might, as part of a hybrid strategy, try to stir up feelings of political, economic and social discrimination. However, recent research has suggested that, despite widespread public concerns that ethnic Russians in eastern Latvia might serve as a basis of separatism, Russian communities are in fact predominantly loyal to the Latvian state, and to membership in EU and NATO.

Public support for separatism remains very low. The situation is largely similar in Estonia. While the predominantly Russian population of the eastern Estonian city of Narva, and the Ida-Viru region are not content with all Estonian state policies, they have higher salaries and better living standards than Russians over the border in Ivangorod.

This suggests a high level of loyalty to the Estonian state in case of conflict. Meanwhile, on jobs and income, there is data to support the idea that segregation between the two communities still exists, and Estonian-Russians perceive inequality of opportunity in the Estonian labor market. However, ethnic distribution by occupational groups is quite balanced between Estonians and non-Estonians. Language proficiency is important for improved chances in education, employment and social position, in turn leading to higher levels of integration.

In sum, as testified by Lamberto Zannier, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, considerable progress has been achieved in integrating Estonian and Latvian society, particularly in education policy, which, while ensuring preservation of minority identities, has created a common media space for all citizens Estonia and facilitated access to citizenship Estonia.

At the same time, according to the OSCE high commissioner, divisions along ethnic lines do persist and additional steps are required to bring majority and minority communities closer together, creating sustainable integration and resilience within Baltic societies.

This is all the more relevant now, given possible analogies with Eastern Ukraine. In Donetsk in early April , support for separatism was only around 30 percent. When the conflict erupted, the majority of the population passively stood by, and an active, well-organized, small minority was able to dominate events, actively controlled and supported by Russia. Hence, regardless of a general lack public support for separatism one should continue to pay close attention to the situation and attitudes of Russian minorities there.

As part of peacetime hybrid operations and information warfare, Russia seeks to achieve and maintain information influence on the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic States, through both conventional media primarily TV and online media, both more popular among Baltic Russians than national language media channels in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania.

This influence is at its most spectacular in Latvia. Since Russian media often serve as a direct channel of information influence, including malign influence, the Baltic States have taken various counter-measures. These have ranged from banning certain Russian channels such as the RTR, previously blocked in Lithuania to expelling Russian journalists declared to be propagandists, or alternatively labelling them persona non grata.

Most recently, in November , Latvia decided to ban nine Russian television channels, in connection with the EU sanctions against their owner Yuri Kovalchuk. Russia tends to react to counter-measures in a highly politicized way, skillfully using arguments based on European values; for example, criticizing Baltic authorities as discriminatory, Russophobic, and acting against freedom of speech and information.

However, the Baltic States have been quick to react to disinformation pressure, using a wide variety of measures. Various fact-checking and anti-disinformation initiatives have been launched in all three Baltic countries, working in close cooperation, and with Ukrainian Stop Fake , Czech European Values and other organizations actively working to counter Russian disinformation.

Although the threat of disinformation is still present today, awareness and resilience are far higher than they were in In other words, Moscow arguing about the Russian minorities in the Baltics is far more a policy tool than an inherent, value-based policy drive.

Besides its obvious geographical location, Belarus is a close political and military ally of Russia, highly dependent on Moscow in economic and energy security terms. However, from the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in until the August presidential elections, Minsk had been conducting a careful, increasingly multi-vectoral foreign policy, trying to balance interests between Russia and the West, hoping to decrease its dependence on Moscow, preventing a Ukraine-type scenario resulting in the loss of Belarusian sovereignty.

However, the 9 August presidential elections were massively rigged, and were followed by an unprecedented wave of demonstrations.

The regime reacted with widespread, brutal crackdowns: thousands were arrested and tortured by the security forces; several people have been killed by the police. Despite widespread protests, the Lukashenko regime has remained relatively stable. In this, significant political, informational, policing and security-related support from Russia has played a decisive role.

In short, it was Russia that prevented the collapse of the Lukashenko system. However, while the regime has managed to prevail, its legitimacy both at home and abroad has been permanently damaged. Neither the European Union nor the United States have recognized the presidential election results; instead, a new wave of sanctions has been imposed on those responsible for repression. Meanwhile, anti-Lukashenko protests in Belarus have continued, despite brutal police reaction and worsening weather conditions.

In addition to these relations, the two countries have a special bilateral integration structure, the so-called Union State. The Union State was established in , originally aimed at creating supra-national integration of Russia and Belarus.

It has been reported that the president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, who came to power in , originally hoped to dominate this bilateral integration against the aging, sick Russian president Boris Yeltsin. However, following the emergence of Vladimir Putin, integration enthusiasm in Minsk gradually decreased, particularly since Putin proposed the incorporation of Belarus into Russia in Since then, development of the Union State has largely stagnated. One the one hand, basic institutional structures have been set up and are functioning: there is a joint budget, and regular meetings of both presidents, governments and parliaments.

On the other hand, the Union State never reached true supra-nationality, but has always remained at an intergovernmental level. Original plans to create a joint constitution, a common currency, genuine customs-free trade, a joint army and several common structures were never realized. The main reason for this is the reluctance of Belarusian elites, including the president, to make concessions on sovereignty.

This is in keeping with the observation that authoritarian countries find it harder to delegate competences to supranational bodies, since it would constrain their own autonomy and power in some respect. In addition to the general phenomenon, the post political context has made Belarus even less willing to give up sovereignty: events in Ukraine have demonstrated that Russia is willing and able to modify borders by force if its geopolitical interests demand, and if Moscow thinks it can manage the risks.

Under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that Belarus would agree to any real implementation of integration measures prescribed in the Union State Treaty, especially while Lukashenko is in power. However, this earlier calculus has been fundamentally transformed by the events of August To remain in power for even a while longer, Lukashenko has little other choice than to offer Russia more and more concessions: political, economic and energy-related.

In particular, Moscow seems likely to use the Union State project as a political tool and the strong dependence of Minsk on Russian economic subsidies as a form of direct leverage. In this way, Moscow could enjoy the benefits of closely influencing sometimes controlling the domestic, foreign, security and defense policies of Belarus, increasing its own security while keeping related costs limited to economic subsidies.

Notwithstanding the above analysis, Belarus has been a close military ally of Russia ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although the early s saw was brief period when neutrality was considered as a future security policy option, from on President Lukashenko re-oriented Minsk to a pro-Russian security and defense policy course.

Belarus military doctrine explicitly names military cooperation with Russia as the primary guarantor of the security and defense of the country.

Military cooperation between the two countries has been close ever since Russia is the main supplier of the military industry of Belarus, and its main market.

Conversely, Belarus produces a number of weapons components which Russia cannot manufacture alone. In addition, Russia provides general staff level military education for the Belarusian military, since Minsk lacks the necessary capabilities. Annually, more than Belarusian officers study at Russian military higher education institutions, and military-to-military ties are traditionally cordial.

For several years, Moscow has been pushing Minsk to host a Russian military base voennaya baza ; however, the project was so far not realized due to the reluctance of the Belarusian leadership to permanently base Russian fighting forces in the country. This applies particularly to the Belarus air defense system, which functions more or less in complete integration with the Russian one, officially within the framework of the Union State.

In , Belarus received at least four S air defense missile systems from Russia, followed by two batteries of Ss in , in addition to at least five as of December Tor-M2 short-range air defense batteries. To a lesser extent the same applies to artillery and surface-to-surface missiles, since Belarus employs a large number of ex-Soviet and Russian MLRS systems, as well as Scud and Tochka-U missiles.

Most recently, in cooperation with China, Belarus developed a new mm MLRS system, the Polonez, with a confirmed range of over kilometers. It is safe to assume that Belarusian artillery alone would be able to striking the Suvalki gap and thus impede military movements of NATO forces.

What happened in Georgia in with the so-called border conflicts had clear similarities to the Winter War, when the Soviets invaded Finland; Crimea in followed the same scenario as the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union in ; and the troops that now have been sent to Kazakhstan to quell that popular uprising are reminiscent of the crushing of revolt in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

As the old joke goes, like the Warsaw Pact, the Collective Security Treaty Organization is a defensive alliance because it only invades its own members. It is because of this shared past that the Baltics are ready to help Ukraine and support it as much as possible.

The Baltic states have learned from past mistakes and understand that collective security is the only hope of survival.

NATO membership is taken extremely seriously, and membership came with a sigh of relief. In the Baltics, even the most Euroskeptic populists, distrustful of Brussels and the United States in other matters, never say anything critical about the Baltics being a part of NATO and the necessity of military spending.

And of course, due to recent Russian actions, support for membership in the alliance has grown even stronger. Membership rates in Baltic organized militias—the rough equivalent of the National Guard in the United States—have soared, last year increasing by The military leadership has always been wary of Russia.

It always has, and until something truly spectacular happens in Russia, it always will. One reason for this is that most people in the Baltic states speak Russian. It was the state language of the Soviet Union, mandated everywhere and enforced on these countries in a broad Russification campaign back in the Soviet days.

In Latvia, for instance, 37 percent of people are native Russian speakers and many more fluent; a lot of Latvians watch Russian media, both official and otherwise.

Last time, back in , we did nothing and sat in the corner, hoping that everything shall pass naturally. So we listen to what Russia says and believe it. So far, we have been given no reason not to. He is also a PhD candidate in communications science.

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